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WHY CANADA HAS NO FAMILY
POLICY: LESSONS FROM FRANCE
AND ITALYO
By PHILIP GIRARD*
This paper uses a comparative legal history approach to
examine the "private" law of the family in France, Italy,
and the major English-speaking countries in order to
clarify the fundamental notions of the family which predated the welfare state. It is suggested that a major
cleavage exists, historically, between an autonomous
family law in France and Italy oriented around notions
of familial solidarity, sibling interdependence and
equality, and intergenerational continuity, and a family
law in the English-speaking countries marked by a
preoccupation with the protection of property rights
and the independence of individual family members.
These contrasts reveal differing societal conceptions
about the importance of family life, and resulted in the
earlier emergence and higher legitimacy of maternal
and child benefits in France and Italy than in the
Englph-speaking countries.

Cette dissertation emplole en examen historique lgal
pour examiner It droit prv6" de la famille en France,
en Italie, et dans tous les pays majeurs anglophones,
pour clarifier la notion fondamentale de la famille qul
pr6date l'tat social. On suggare qu'une division existe,
historiquement, entre un drot de la famille autonome
et un drit de la famille dans les pays anglophones, qul
est not6 par une pr&occupation ave la protection des
droits de propri6t6 et avec l'ind6pendance des
membres individuels de la fasnille. Ces contrastes
r~vlent ds conceptions socitales diffrentes i l'6gard
de l'importance de la vie familiale, et ont donn6 comme
rmsultat l'Emergeace plus t~t et la legitimit6 plus 6lev6e
des allocations pour les mares et les enfants en France
et en Italie que dans les pays anglophones.
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A company in France recently announced that it would offer
three-year parental leaves to any of its employees wishing to take them
and that the remuneration would be $660 per month. Extended parental
leave is already available as a state benefit in France, but only after the
birth of a third child, whereas the company would provide this leave
after the birth of a first or second child as well. The benefit is to be
financed 80 per cent from company funds and 20 per cent from a
company-financed fund normally used to finance leisure activities for
employees. The objective of the company is to open 40 new positions in
this way.'
I mention this programme as a way of linking my chosen topic to
the broad theme of the Lewtas endowment: economic and business
policy. The link between the title of this paper and this theme may not
be immediately apparent, but that lack of connection serves only to
illustrate my point. I want to suggest that the absence, in Canada and
other English-speaking countries, of what the Europeans call "family
policy," results in part from a tendency to see individuals where the
Europeans see families. The result is that a whole range of issues
relating to family life and family structure are simply defined out of
existence in our literature and our legislation relating to economic and
business policy, and in other areas of life as well. I want to explore how
that has come about using the methodology of comparative legal history.
The tools of comparative sociology and comparative political economy
are usually employed to investigate this question, but I will argue that an
analysis of comparative notions of the family will shed some new light on
this problem.
Let me define what is meant by "family policy" and then restate
the problem before proceeding to the argument. Family policy, as
understood in continental Europe, refers to a whole range of measures
aimed at assisting parents in raising their children. 2 Initially these
1

Firm offers 3-year parental leave, The [Toronto] Globe and Mai (9 February 1994) Al.

2 For a country-by-country overview, see W. Dumon, ed., Family Policy in EEC Counhies
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1990).

A more

extensive analysis of theoretical issues can be found in several of the contributions to J. Aldous &
W. Dumon, eds., The Politics and Programs ofFamily Poliy: United States and European Perspectives
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measures were purely economic and aimed at socializing, to a certain
extent, the cost of bearing and raising children. Increasingly they came
to include wider forms of support, so that today family policy would
include family allowances, maternity and parental leave, child care and
pre-school education programmes, housing allowances, and subsidized
family vacation resorts, among other things. By looking at family
support policies in a comparative context, a definite pattern can be
found. The continental members of the old European Economic
Community (EEC) and Scandinavia consistently provide the most
generous, extensive, and effective benefits; the United States
consistently provides the least; and the United Kingdom, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand show up in the middle, leaning more toward
the United States with regard to particular benefits and more toward
Europe on others. 3 Historically, France has spent more than twice as
much as Britain on comparable benefits, 4 and many times what Canada
or the United States has spent. Why do countries which have reasonably
comparable economies and standards of living set their priorities so
differently?
In answering this question, the predominant analysis looks to the
tools and language of comparative political economy. Various authors
have developed typologies of the welfare state: they find that countries
vary along an axis which runs from liberalism on one end to corporatism
on the other, with the countries most influenced by liberalism having the
least generous benefits and those most influenced by corporatism or
socialism having the most generous benefits. Another way of stating this

(Notre Dame, Indiana Center for the Study of Man, University of Notre Dame, 1980).
3 The classic study is S.B. Kamerman & AJ. Kahn, eds., Family Policy: Government and
Families in Fourteen Countries (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978). The authors
distinguish three categories of countries: those with an explicit and comprehensive family policy,
such as France and Sweden; those with an explicit but more narrowly focused family policy, such as
Germany and Denmark; and those with an implicit or reluctant family policy, or where the notion of
such a policy is rejected, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. More
recently, see J.Bradshaw et aL, Support for Children.,A comparison of arrangementsin fifteen
countries (London: Hmso, 1993) (Canada not included).
From a Canadian perspective, see F. Lesemann & R. Nicol, "Family Policy- International
Comparisons" in M. Baker, ed., Canada'sChangingFamilies:Challenges to PublicPolicy (Ottawa:
Vanier Institute of the Family, 1994). The authors distinguish between "family-oriented" (France),
"privacy-oriented" (England, Canada, and United States), and "statist" (Sweden) social policy.
4 R. Lawson, "Western Europe: A Comparative Study" in A. Samuels, ed., Social Secuiy and
Family Law (London, England: Chameleon Press, 1979) 293 (France spent 4.8 per cent of its
national income on "family charges" in 1970, compared to 2.2 per cent in the United Kingdom).
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would be to say that there is greater tolerance of inequality in the states
more committed to liberal political ideals.5
It is hard to quarrel with these conclusions, framed as they are at
quite a high level of abstraction. I want to suggest, though, that there is
another important variable in this equation when one isolates the family
support measures of the welfare state from the whole range of measures
normally included under the rubric of the welfare state. That variable is
the conceptualization of the recipients of state benefits as poor
individuals, or as families with children. Some of the European welfare
states, such as France, actually redistribute much more income from the
childless to those with children than from the rich to the
poor-horizontal rather than vertical redistribution, if you will, and this
fact seems to have been overlooked in most existing analyses of the
welfare state. 6 We will miss something essential about the French
welfare state in particular if we are not attuned to the importance, both
historical and contemporary, of the notions of familial, as well as
individual, entitlements. For this reason, too, feminist analysis has been
unable to. explain satisfactorily the difference between, for example,
English and French family provisions. 7 A broader focus, which looks at
different familial ideologies as well as gender ideologies, seems to be
called for.
A family policy cannot exist without some idea of what a family
is, and this takes us back to basic social and legal ideas about the family.
My own research in the comparative legal history of family law and
family property has revealed some rather marked differences in
approach between the common law countries 8 on the one hand, and
5 The most recent major contribution to this literature is 0. Esping-Andersen, The Three
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press 1990). For a review of the literature on
welfare state typologies using this methodology, see D. Mitchell, Income Transfers in Ten Welfare
States (Aldershot, UK- Avebuy, 1991).
6 Two exceptions are D.R. Cameron, "Continuity and Change in French Social Policy: The
Welfare State under Gaullism, Liberalism and Socialism" in J.L Ambler, ed., The French Welfare
State: Surviving Social andIdeologicalChange (New York: New York University Press, 1991) 58; and
J. Baker, "Comparing National Priorities: Family and Population Policy in Britain and France"
(1986) 15 J. of Social Pol'y 421.
7 This argument is well made by S. Pedersen, Family, Dependence and the Origins of the
Wdfare State: Britainand France,1914-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) at 1-21.
See also D. Ashford, "Advantages of Complexity:. Social Insurance in France" in Ambler, ed., supra
note 6 and ifr&note 107.
8 1 will not be referring to Quebec or Louisiana when speaking of Canada or the United
States, and hence will refer to them as "common law countries" for the purposes of this paper. By
England I mean England and Wales. Quebec has recently begun to develop its own family policy:
C. Le Bourdais & N. Marcil-Gratton, "Quebes Pro-Active Approach to Family Policy: 'Thinking
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France and Italy on the other. In contrast to French and Italian law, the
common law, at least since the early modem period, has not treated the
family as a juridical entity with a collective interest which might be
measured against that of individual family members. The law of family
maintenance, family property, and successions, viewed in historical
context, reveals that the common law has theorized family law as a series
of relationships between individuals, unleavened by any concept of
solidarity or equality. Its priorization of property as the pre-eminent
legal relationship, I will argue, impeded the development of an
autonomous domain of family law. Pre-codal law on the continent had
some similarities with this view, but nineteefith century jurists articulated
an idea of the family as a collective juridical entity which served as a
brake on the liberty and autonomy of all members. This notion was
obviously not nearly as much a restraint on the husband's liberty as it
was on the wife's, but the fact that continental jurists never lost sight of
the purpose of paternal and marital power was significant for future
developments. With the evolution of spousal equality in the twentieth
century, the notion of the "family interest" has become more, rather
than less, evident in French and Italian law, even if social mores have
admitted more autonomy for individual family members. 9
This historical dichotomy is significant because since 1950 most
of the comparative law literature on family law has focused on the
"convergence" of family law among all western countries.' 0 It is true
that in the last thirty years there have been strikingly similar
developments in all western countries regarding spousal equality, the
equalization of status for children born inside and outside marriage, the
liberalization of divorce, and the availability of abortion and
contraception. Yet within the French and Italian legal traditions these
changes have been seen as providing more autonomy for family
members without doing away with the basic notion of family solidarity.
A certain convergence in the formal expression of family law may
conceal, I will suggest, differing socio-legal conceptions of the "family." 11
and Acting Family,'" in Baker, ed., supra note 3, 103. Quebec family law is formally civilian but in
substance is strongly marked by common law and Scandinavian ideals of the independence and
autonomy of family members. It is a distinctive hybrid which I hope to examine at a future date.
9 See inf& note 64 and accompanying text.
10

See MA. Glendon: Stat; Law and Family:FamilyLaw in Transitionin the United States and
Western Europe (Amsterdam: Elsevier North-Holland, 1977); The New Family and the New Property
(Scarborough: Butterworths, 1981); The Transformationof FamilyLaw: State, Law and Familyin the
United States and Western Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).
11 Mary Ann Glendon suggests as much inAbortion and Divorce in Western Law (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
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These underlying concepts of the family have historically played an
important role in shaping the differing contours of the continental and
Anglo-American welfare states.
The body of this paper is divided into three- parts. First, I
examine the private law of the family (I), looking in turn at the
autonomy of family law (A), the integrity of its concepts (B), and the
influence of other normative orders (C), with a view to elucidating
underlying notions of the family. I will then consider the notion of the
family underlying certain family benefits in public law (II), namely family
allowances and maternity leave, before concluding (III). The terms
"private" and "public" are nowhere more slippery than in a discussion of
the family, and I use them here as convenient labels, not as possessing
any inherent truth.
I. THE ETHOS OF FAMILY LAW: PRIVATE LAW
A. Autonomy
Family law in the common law world has only recently begun to
acquire any recognition as a distinct field of lawj 2 The nineteenth
century treatise writers invariably spoke of the "law of domestic
relations" as opposed to "family law." Those works which surveyed the
field as a whole, Tapping Reeve's Law of Baron and Femme,13 James
Schouler's A Treatise on the law of the Domestic Relations,1 4 and William
Pinder Eversley's The Law of Domestic Relations,15 treated in separate
chapters husband and wife, parent and child, guardian and ward, and
master and servant, and also included a general chapter on infancy.
Each chapter was essentially an aspect of the law of persons, and the
reason for grouping them together was the functional nexus of the

121 will treat the "common law world" as a unity, at the risk of some oversimplification. Such
differences as exist between, say, English and United States law on particular points of family law
are relatively unimportant when both are compared with French or Italian law.
13 (New Haven: Oliver Steele, 1816). Its full title nicely illustrates the point made in this
paragraph. The Law ofBaron and Femme, of Parentand Child4 of Guardianand Ward" ofMaster and
ervan" and ofthe Powersof the Cour of Chancery,with an F-ay on the tenns Heir,Heis, and Heirs
of the Body.
14 (Boston: Little Brown, 1870). See more recently, Law of Domestic Relations, 6th ed.
(Boston: Little Brown, 1905)
15 (London: Stevens & Haynes, 1885). See, more recently, LL Stranger-Jones, ed, Eversey's
Law of DomesticRelations (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1951).
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household rather than any overarching legal concept of the family.
Indeed, none of these texts attempted to give any general definition of
"family." Nor had Blackstone, and to this day English, Commonwealth,
and United States law persist in treating the meaning of the term
law. As Katherine O'Donovan
"family" as a question of fact rather than
16
granted
for
taken
says, its meaning is
Thus, when R.H. Graveson entitled his retrospective work A
Century of FamilyLaw 1857-1957,17 he was guilty of an anachronism. He
was correct in stating, however, that "family law" was not a term of art in
English law, but rather "a conventional means of referring to so much of
our law, as directly affects the family." 18 Coinciding with the publication
of Graveson's work was the first edition of P.M. Bromley's Family Law,
and so we may regard family law in the modem sense as having been
officially discovered in England only in the 1950s. 19
General works on English law were more sceptical of the "new
kid on the block." Philip James waited until the 8th edition of his
Introduction to English Law2o to add a section on family law to his
chapter on private law. A passing commentary spoke volumes about
English attitudes to the subject. "[O]f recent years," he observed,
"'family law, formerly something of a tiresome child to21 the lawyers, has
become a field of diligent interest and earnest reform."
Surprisingly, there is to this day no fully comprehensive text on
family law in Canada. The one text which possesses the title Family Law
in Canada is better described by its sub-title, "Fourth edition of Power

16 Family Law Matters (London: Pluto Press, 1993) at 10.
17

(London: Stevens, 1957). He chose the date 1857 as the year of passage of the Matrimonial
CausesAc4 1857, (U.K.) 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, which permitted judicial divorce in England for the
first time.
18 Ibid. at vii. Thus the work includes chapters on tort, criminal law, evidence, and taxation as
well as the more traditional areas of domestic relations.
19 Although the term had been in informal usage for at least half a century, AN. Dicey had
used it in his Lectures on the relationbetween law andpublic opinion in Englandduring the nineteenth
centuy (London: Macmillan, 1905) at 394 when discussing changes in married women's property
law. A slightly earlier work than Bromley's which used the same titie, J. Hamawi's Family Law
(London: Stevens, 1953), seems to have died without issue.
In retrospect it is surprising to realize that the sixth and last edition of Eversley, supra note 15,
with its antique organizational framework intact, appeared as late as 1951.
20 (London: Butterworths, 1972).
21

lbid, at 447. Meanwhile, O. H. Phillips waited until 1977 to include 6 pages on family law as
one of the "Main Branches of English Law" discussed in the 7th edition ofA FirstBook of English
Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1977).
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on Divorce and other Matrimonial Causes." 2 2 It is heavily slanted

toward matrimonial law and has relatively little coverage of the parentchild relationship, most notably nothing at all about how one establishes
the tie of paternity.

matrimonial

property,2 4

We have books on children and the law,2 3

and divorce,25 but no actual treatise on family

law as a whole in Canada.

In the civil law traditions of France and Italy, family law has been
recognized as an autonomous field for at least a century and a half. As

early as the seventeenth century Domat singled out the legal obligations
created by birth and marriage as distinct from all other types of
obligations. 26 The lesser scope afforded to individual will and the
correspondingly greater place occupied by the notion of public order-in

other words, the centrality of status as opposed to contract in family law
-were said to set it apart from the rest of the droit civil. Demolombe, in

his magisterial thirty one volume commentary on the Code Napoldon,
agreed, to such an extent that he was willing to label all of family law as

public law. 27 In France we find an 1867 text on "family law," and in Italy
two works dating from 1914 and 1915, although there are probably
earlier examples. 28 Even this early French text insisted on the autonomy
22

C Davies, FamilyLaw in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1984). This is meant as no reproach
to Professor Davies, who labours under certain constraints as the editor of an inherited text.
23
N.C. Bala & KL Clarke, The Child and the Law (Scarborough: McGraw-Hill Ryerson,
1981); N.C. Bala, J.P. Homick & R. Vogi, eds., CanadianChild Welfare Law: Children, Familiesand
the State (Toronto: Thompson, 1991); and J. Wilson & M. Tomlinson, Wdson: Childrenand the Law,
2d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1986).
24 J.G. McLeod & A.A. Mamo, MatrimonialProperty Law in Canada (Toronto: Carswell,
1993); B. Hovius & T.G. Youdan TheLaw of Family Property(Toronto: Carswell, 1991).
25 J. Payne, Payne on Divorce, 3d ed., (Scarborough: Carswell, 1993); T.W. Hainsworth, ed.,
Reville's DivorceActAnnotated(Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1986-94); and Davies, supra note 22.
26 J. Domat, The Civil Law in its Natural Order, trans. by W. Strahan , vol. 1 (Boston: Little
Brown, 1853) at 8-21. I am not suggesting that Domat (1625-1696) himself had isolated "family
law" in the modem sense, but his work clearly provided the conceptual basis upon which an
autonomous family law might be built.
27
Demolombe, Cours de Code Napolion, 4th ed., vol. 1 (Paris: A. Durand, 1869, 31 vols.) at
15-16.
28 j. Oudot, Du droit de famille (Paris: A. Marescq, 1867). This work was the published
version of lectures given at the University of Paris by Oudot, who bequeathed his notes to his
former student Charles Demangeat upon his death in 1862, with the injunction to publish them in
book form. It thus appears that "family law" was understood as a coherent field considerably earlier
than 1862, perhaps as early as 1838 when Demangeat began his studies under Oudot.
In P.Ungari, / dirtto difamigliain Italiadaile Costituzioni "giacobine"al Codice civile del 1942
(Bologna, 1970) the following two works are cited: F. Luzzatto, "Intorno al diritto di famiglia," in
Scrittigiudid dedicati e offeri a Giampiero Chironined XWII anno del suo insegnamento,I (Rome,
1914) and 11 dirittodifamiglia (Rome, 1915).
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of family law, saying that it would be an error to include under the label
"droit de famille," all dispositions of private, public, and criminal law
having something to do with the family; in these branches of law, "l'id6e
de famille ne serait ... qu'un accessoire." 2 9

It is important to realize that it was largely treatise writers who
created the category of "family law" in France and Italy, since the
concept of family as such did not play a prominent role in either the
Code Napoleon of 1804 or the Italian Civil Code of 1865. These codes
treated marriage and family relations as part of the law of persons, and
did not set out a separate book or title on family law. The strong
emphasis on the husband's paternal authority over his children and
marital authority over his wife seemed almost to blot out any
independent notion of family. Yet doctrine and jurisprudence insisted
that the husband's extensive powers were not granted to him as a feudal
prerogative, but rather in the interest of the family as a whole 30
Jurists were able to synthesize a "family law" quite easily for two
reasons. The first, sociological, was simply the cultural significance of
the family, both nuclear and extended, in strongly Roman Catholic
societies with large peasant populations. Despite the principle of
secularisation in both codes, their provisions "remained profoundly
marked by the canonical conception of marriage and the family."3'
Neither code shrank from including essentially moral injunctions derived
from religious precepts: thus, children owe honour and respect to their
parents and spouses owe each other fidelity, succour, and assistane 3 2
Yet, those provisions are far from being considered just nice words. In
1981 a 300 page book was published in France on the latter provision of
the Civil Code.33
29

Oudot, ibia. at 4.

30 Although the Code NapoMon gave the father an apparently unlimited usufruct over any
property of his minor children, doctrine and jurisprudence agreed that his administrative powers
should be assimilated to those of a tutor. He was allowed to spend any revenues for the benefit of
the family, but could not make gifts, compromise legal actions, etc. See J. Thabaut, "L'Evolution de
la I.gislation sur la Famille depuis 1804," doctoral thesis (Toulouse, 1913) 79.
Italian jurists stressed that the husband's status as "head of the family" under the Codice Civile
of 1865 was not a feudal prerogative of his sex, but a power necessary to safeguard the family as a
unit: V. Librando, "Italian Law" in A.G. Chloros, ed., The Reform of Family Law in Europe
(Deventer, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1978) 151 at 152.
31 J. Foyer, "French Law" in A.G. Chloros, ibid, 75 at 77. For Italian law, see Ungari, supra
note 28 at 128-36. See also section LC, below.
32
See Arts. 371 and 212 C. Civ. (France), Arts. 315 and 143 C. Civ. (Italy).
33

C. Philippe, Le devoir de secours et d'assistanceentre spour Esai sur l'entraideconjugale
(Paris: Librairie g6n6rale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1981).
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The second reason, juridical, was the clarity of the codes in
defining the nature and effects of the two primary relationships in family
law, marriage and filiation, and I will have more to say about them when
I consider the integrity of family law's conceptual apparatus.
To return to English law and ask why family law did not develop
a similar autonomy, I believe we have to look at the conceptualization of
property. Although it is often said that the history of England's
constitutional law can be found in its property law, it is less often noted
that family law also has its roots in property. In matrimonial law, in
parent-child relations, and in the law of succession, the flourishing of
absolute property rights from a relatively early date in the common law
led to a constant undertheorization of family law and a virtual metastasis
of property notions, which had grave consequences for wives and
children.3 4 The totalitarian legal fiction of marital unity led to an
analysis of the husband-wife relationship as one involving powers rather
than duties while the marriage subsisted, which impeded the emergence
of an effective support obligation between husband and wife for
centuries. Contrary to what one might think, the husband had only a
moral obligation to support his wife at common law. As Eversley put it
bluntly in 1885, the wife "has no claim on her husband, even starving and
deserted by him." 3 5 And not until 1950, according to Otto KahnFreund, did a wife in England gain "an enforceable claim to
maintenance without limitation as to amount and without the need for
separation or restitution of conjugal
bringing proceedings for divorce,
' 's6
rights in order to enforce it.
34
Mary Jane Mossman has noted a tendency in modem Canadian legal academic writing to
priorize "property" over "family": "Toward 'New Property' and 'New Scholarship': An Assessment
of Canadian Property Scholarship" (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall L.J. 633 at 646-48.

35 See Eversley, supra note 15 at 251, where he makes it clear that the husband's duty only
arose out of the Elizabethan poor law, and was thus owed not to the wife but to the overseers of the
poor. English authors would typically dance around this doctrine by saying that the husband had a
duty to maintain his wife, but that it was unenforceable by her while the marriage lasted. See, for
example, S.M. Cretney, Piinc !es ofFamily Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1974) at 217-18. The
question of how one can characterize a legal relation as an unenforceable right went unanswered
and unexamined.
The agency of necessity was only an apparent exception to this state of affairs. This doctrine
allowed the wife to pledge the husband's credit for household necessities, and it did not depend on
the husband's volition in the sense that he could not countermand orders placed with suppliers,
either specifically or in general. It is obvious that this doctrine provided only dejuwe and not defacto
comfort to the wife. There was no obligation on a trader to continue to supply credit if the husband
indicated any resistance to payment. Far from a "right" to support, the agency of necessity was a
mere power, with no correlative duty on anyone.
36
"England" in W. G. Friedmann, ed, Mattmenia PropertyLaw (Toronto: Carswell, 1955) at
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Similarly, with regard to children, the common law recognized
no duty on the father's part to support his minor children. Or rather, in
the euphemism of the common law, there was a duty of imperfect
obligation--i.e., one that was unenforceable. In 1952 Lord Chief Justice
Goddard observed sheepishly that "anomalous as it may seem, a father is
'3 7
not by the civil [i.e., non-criminal] law liable for a child's maintenance.
A father could only be obliged to support a child in need if the poor law
authorities intervened, i.e., if the child was in danger of being thrown on
the parish.
And here we intersect with a sub-theme in English family law:
the priorization of duties owed to the state as opposed to those owed to
family members. William Blackstone illustrates this perfectly. He
speaks of the father as having a general legal obligation to support his
children, but then refers to the Elizabethan poor law as the source of
that duty. That statute38 imposed a liability on a father toward the poor
law authorities and no one else-it was not enforceable by the child or
the mother. In discussing a provision of the same statute, which creates
a penal obligation for fathers to provide necessaries to their children
incapable of working, Blackstone states approvingly that the "policy of
our laws, which are ever watchful to promote industry, did not mean to
compel a father to maintain his idle and lazy children in ease and
indolence." 39 In other words, the father's property is subject to no moral
claim by the family; the state will intervene if the dependents are
starving and unable to work, but in no other case, and even then it is not
the dependent but the state agency which can enforce the obligation.
Likewise, an adult had no duty to support his or her parents
except through the mechanism of the Elizabethan poor law. At no
point, apparently, was even this indirect support obligation extended to
in-laws or siblings. United States law diverged somewhat from the
English approach and began to recognize a mutual obligation of support
between parent and child by statute or judicial reform, but even by 1940
this position was by no means unanimous among the states.40

37
38

NationalAssistanceBoardv. Wdkinson, [1952] 2 Q.B. 648 at 657.

AnActefor the Releife of the Poore 1601 (U.K.) 43 Elizabeth 1,c. 2, s. 7.
39 Commentaries on the Laws of England vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1765-69) at 449.
Schouler, supra note 14 at 318, also confuses private law duties with duties owed under the
Elizabethan poor law.
40 j W. Madden in Handbook of the Law of Persons and Domestic Relations (St. Paul: West
Publishing, 1931) says that state decisions are "conflicting" on the existence of such a duty at
common law, but that the general current of authority is to recognize the power of the infant to bind
his father for necessaries. As we have seen in the context of the wife's agency of necessity, this is not
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In terms of succession law, freedom of testation as to realty was
effectively established in England by the seventeenth century, enabling
the propertied to determine for themselves the contours of their family
obligations after death 41 Interestingly, even Blackstone, the great
apologist for absolute property, was uneasy about this limitless freedom,
observing that "perhaps it had not been amiss, if the parent had been
bound to leave [his or her] children at the least a necessary
subsistence." 42 Where a decedent left no will, realty descended to the
eldest male child under English law until 1926, according to the rule of
primogeniture. Although primogeniture was increasingly controversial
toward the end of the 19th century, this inequality was justified almost to
the very end by the same argument Blackstone used in the context of
support: the necessity of maintaining work incentives for younger sons.
In the nineteenth century, English and continental law diverged
more and more in their legal conceptions of the family. French and
Italian law accepted economic liberalism in all areas of law outside the
family, but resolutely banished it from the hearth. In fact, in one
important respect French and Italian law became less liberal in the
nineteenth century. The Code Napoldon of 1804 and Italy's Codice
Pisanelli of 1865 both severely restricted freedom of testation by
adopting forced heirship (this refers to mandatory equal sharing of a
deceased's property among his or her children, whether the deceased
died with a will or not, and it remains the cardinal feature of French and
Italian succession law to this day).43
English law, on the other hand, had long ago abolished
mandatory shares of personalty for a deceased's widow and children, 44
the same thing as a full-fledged right to supporL H. Clarke, in her book Social Legislation, 2d eL
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957) at 227-30, states that a common law duty is generally
recognized, although there are some counter-currents; she does not elaborate on what exactly this
"common law duty" entails.
41 The combination of the Statute of TV-dlU 1542-1543 (U.K.), 34 & 35 Henry 4, c. 5, which
allowed one to devise all of one's copyhold and socage estates and two-thirds of the estates one held
in military tenures, and the TenuresAbolitionAct 1660 (U.K.), 12 Charles 2, c. 24, which abolished
the military tenures, led to complete freedom of testation regarding realty for males and unmarried
females. Married women were specifically excluded from the benefit of the 1540 statute (s. 14).
42
Blackstone, supra note 39 at 438.
43

See today Arts. 913-930 C. Civ. (France) and Arts. 536-564 C. Civ. (Italy) and also infra

note 60.
44 The custom, possibly universal in Britain in medieval times, of providing an unalterable
one-third share of a deceased's personalty for the widow, one-third to be shared among the
children, and one-third as disposable by will, remained as the custom of London and a few other
areas in the 1760s, as noted by Blackstone, supra note 39. The last local custom to this effect in
England was, however, abolished by Parliament in 1798: P. Langford, Public Life and the Propened
Englishman 1689-1798 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) at 48. It remains in Scots law to this day,
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and in 1833 it effectively abolished the widow's right to dower and her
life interest in one-third of the deceased's realty, by providing that the
husband could override it by will.45 Postmortem familial obligation was
thus finally severed from property. And with the married women's
property acts of the 1870s and 1880s, English law embraced economic
liberalism within the very bosom of the family by declaring that husband
and wife were totally separate in relation to property. Historians have
pointed out that English feminists shared the mid-Victorian optimism
about the beneficial effects of an expanding market economy-, this belief
buttressed their argument that the only way for married women to
participate fully in society was to ensure their recognition as totally
autonomous economic actors. 6
This dichotomy between English and continental law can be seen
most clearly in the work of Henry Maine, whose 1861 opus Ancient
Law47 provided the ideological basis, along with John Stuart Mill of
course, for a new family law shorn of the feudal prerogatives of marital
unity. Maine was as severe a critic of the existing common law of
matrimonial property as he was of the French law of forced heirship:
both, in his view, were contrary to the "movement of the progressive
societies [which] has been ... distinguished by the gradual dissolution of

family dependency and the growth of individual obligation in its
place." 48 One United States historian of the family vulgarized Maine's
albeit with some qualifications: D. M. Walker, Principlesof Scottish PrivateLaw, vol. 4, 4th ed.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) at 111-256.
45

DowerAct 1833 (U.K), 3 & 4 William 4, c. 104. Nineteenth century United States law went
in quite the opposite direction, when most states instituted a minimum share (generally one-third)
which the surviving spouse could elect for if the deceased spouse's will provided less: C. Shammas et
al., Inheritancein America: from Colonial Tunes to the Present (New Brunswick, NJ.: Rutgers
University Press, 1987) at 224-58. In Canada, dower vanished fairly quickly in the West, where it
was in some provinces replaced by "homestead rights" or a revived statutory form of dower, and in
Newfoundland, where it was not. It proved more tenacious in the Maritime colonies and Ontario,
where my impression is that it remained an important part of the "moral economy" of these
agricultural societies. In all jurisdictions, however, common law dower could be avoided by various
techniques and no empirical studies exist to verify how extensively it was used (or avoided) in
practice.
46
C. Hall, "Strains in the 'firm of Wife, Children and Friends'? Middle-class women and
employment in early north-central England" in P. Hudson and W.R. Lee, Women's work and the
family economy in historicalperspective(Manchester. Manchester University Press, 1990) 106 at 12026.
47

Ancient Law: its connection with the early history of society, and its relation to modem ideas
(London: John Murray, 1963).
48
Ibid. at 168. Views on this subject identical to Maine's can be found in F.H. Lawson, The
Rational Strength of English Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1951) at 38. Maine's biographer
suggests that he was from humble parentage and "consciously secretive" about his ancestry
throughout his life, with one exception. His godfather, the Reverend John Bird Sumner, was a
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views in the following way: "the new view," said Arthur Calhoun in 1917,
"is that the higher and more obligatory relation is to society rather than
to the family; the family goes back to the age of savagery while the state
belongs to the age of civilization." 49 English, United States, and
Canadian law all evolved within twenty years in the direction advocated
by Maine, but his influence on the continent was negligible. By 1900 the
elements of status left in English family law had been reduced to the
barest possible minimum, as absolute property rights and freedom of
contract picked up the slack. French and Italian law, by contrast, had
been thoroughly familialized.
The doubts and hesitations of the English-speaking world about
whether family law is "real" law find no counterpart in French or Italian
academic literature. Not only is the tradition of writing about family law
a venerable one, it is also a rich one. The sophistication of Jean
Carbonnier's treatise on family law, which incorporates extensive
references to the relevant literatures in history, sociology, demography,
psychology, and legal theory, simply cannot be compared with any legal
text yet produced in the English-speaking world. 50
The autonomy of family law is so much taken for granted today
on the continent that the debates are not about whether it is
autonomous but how. One author has argued that this autonomy resides
in the ultimate goal of family law, which is the full development of the
human person. 51 Others suggest that this ideal is too abstract, that what
sets family law apart is its basic principle of the satisfaction of needs
rather than the reward of merit.52 In other words, family law demarcates
a zone of altruism, solidarity, and economic welfare in a world of
competition, alienation, and meritocracy.

cousin to Maine's mother, and ultimately became Archbishop of Canterbury in 1848. His
intervention was crucial in getting Maine admitted to Christ's Hospital, a well-known charity school,
where he began his brilliant academic career. See G. Feaver,From Status to Contract:A Biography
ofSirHeny Main 1822-1888 (London: Longmans, 1969) at 4-5.
49 A Social History of the United States Family From Colonial Tunes to the Present, vol. 3
(Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1919) at 171.
50 J. Carbonnier, Droit dvil La Fami/l, t. 2, 14e dd. (Paris: xti, 1992). A hallmark of the
French and Italian academic writing on family law is that it integrates scholarship in law with
scholarship about law. The only treatise I have found in the English-speaking world which attempts
this to some extent is O. Stone, FamilyLaw:An account ofthe Law of DomesticRelations in England
and Wales in the Last Quarterof the Twentieth Century, with Some Comparisons (London: Macmillan,
1977).
51
E. du Pontavice, L'autonomie du droit de lafamille (1974).
52 Carbonnier, supra note 50 at 6.
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B. Integrty
The basic corpus of legal rules governing the family has been
found in the civil codes of France and Italy from 1804 and 1865
respectively, supplemented by an ever-increasing amount of case law and
doctrinal literature, and nourished by other orders of normativity
(especially religious). All of family law, however, is organized around
two fundamental juridical concepts: marriage and filiation.
"Tout le droit de la famille," writes Jean Carbonnier, "peut
r~ellement se construire A partir de ces deux notions premieres."53
These legal states give rise to relationships of affinity and kinship, as we
would say in English, alliance and parentiin French law, and affiniti and
parentela in Italian law. Legal relationships arising from marriage subsist
not only between spouses, but also between in-laws. The relationship
arising from affinity is most important in determining support
obligations and marriage prohibitions, but it has legal effects in a
number of other contexts, both inside and outside the respective civil
codes of France and Italy. The obligation of support extends to parentsin-law, sons-in-law, and daughters-in-law in both French5 4 and Italian55
law. It ends only when the person "responsible" for the affinity and all
issue of the relationship in question have died; in other words, a son-inlaw would continue to be legally liable for the support of his mother-inlaw even after the death of his wife, provided children had been born of
the marriage and at least one was still alive.56 With regard to marriage
prohibitions too, the relationship of affinity continues after death, such
that it is still prohibited to marry one's deceased spouse's sibling.57
53 bid. at 16.
54

A. 206 C. civ. (France).

55

At. 433 C. civ. (Italy).
For French law, see Art. 206 C. civ.; for Italian law, see ArL 434 C. civ. In Italian law, the
obligation will also cease between affines when the creditor of the obligation remarries. It is quite
true that there is very little litigation aimed at enforcing the support obligation, and that its
continued existence in the civil codes is largely for symbolic reasons. Yet these symbols remain
important: 77 per cent of the French population approved of the retention of these provisions in
their current form, according to a 1969 survey, after their legal effects were clearly explained. J.
Commaille,Familiessans justice? Le droit et la justiceface aux transfomationsde la famile (Paris:
1982), c. 4.
56

57 Although in France (Art. 164 C. civ.) it is possible for the President of the Republic, "pour
des causes graves," to override this prohibition, as well as the prohibition on the marriage of affines
in the direct line, provided the marriage producing the affinity has been dissolved by death; in the
case of divorce, the dispensing power is not available. In Italy, the court may grant this dispensation
(Art. 87 C. civ.), again only where the marriage has been dissolved by death rather than divorce.
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Filiation refers to establishing the parenthood tie, either
paternity or maternity, and has no exact counterpart in the common
law.58 It has always been regulated with much more attention to detail
on the continent than in the common law world, probably because of its
impact upon succession. As Carbonnier writes, "Le droit de succession
est l'effet le plus tangible de la parent6, de la communaut6 de sang."5 9
The law of succession is deeply impregnated with the importance of
solidarity, equality, and continuity in family life. Whereas the operative
legal metaphors in the common law come from business law and
contract (liquidation of a deceased's estate is like winding up a
corporation and often done by non-family members; and testamentary
freedom echoes freedom of contract), succession law in France and Italy
is totally dictated by the importance of blood (and more recently,
marital) relationships. The deceased is entitled to leave by will a certain
proportion of his or her estate, called the "free" share, but the
mandatory share to which a deceased's spouse or child 60 is entitled is
calculated by taking into account the value of all substantial gifts made
during life. If the deceased has exceeded this "free" portion, the heirs
are entitled to claim the excess from the inter vivos donees.
The rules of succession law are not pressed into service simply at
the moment of death, but are seen to have an impact throughout life as
well; to quote Carbonnier once again, "[c]'est sur une id6e de
copropri6t6 familiale que se fonde le droit de succession ab intestat."61
Curiously, state law is now more strict than canon law. The new code of canon law in 1983 removed
the prohibition on marrying one's deceased spouse's sibling.
58 For a clear and succinct treatment of the topic in English, see G.L Certoma, The Italian
LegalSystem (London: Butterworths, 1985).
59 Supra note 50 at 575. Elsewhere he has criticized the Soviet Civil Code for presenting the
law of successions as involving only patrimonial concerns: "Mais qu'est-ce qui fait les h6ritiers? la
certitude des filiations. Qu'est-ce qui rend les filiations certaines? la preuve des mariages. I1est
contre nature de dissocier du droit de la famille le droit des successions, qui est conditionn6 par
lui": Le droit non civil de lafamille, Publications de la Facult6 de Droit et des Sciences Sociales de
Poitiers (puF, 1983) at vii.
60 It is not only the surviving spouse and children of the deceased who are able to claim a
share in the hereditary reserve: the parents may as well if the deceased leaves no issue. Thus it is
only where the deceased leaves no spouse, issue, or parents that complete testamentary freedom
exists (see Art. 916 C. civ. (France) and Art. 536 C. civ. (Italy)).
The surviving spouse in Italy may share in the reserve, but not in France. Since 1972, however,
a surviving spouse in actual need in France may claim support from the deceased's estate within a
year of the latter's death (Art. 207 C. civ.). The philosophy of the French system has traditionally
been that the surviving spouse's share in the marital community of property is sufficient protection.
For a convenient overview of recent developments, see D. Waters, "Invading the Succession
on behalf of the Family-Europe, and Common Law Canada and Qu6bec" in E. Caparros, ed.,
M8lnges Gemain Bre (Montr6al: Wilson & Lafleur, 1993) 71.
61
Supra note 50 at 575.
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And as Jack Goody has said, "transmission morts causa is not only the
means by which the reproduction of the social system is carried out ... ; it

is also the way in which interpersonal relationships are structured." 62
Even the mechanics of transmitting a deceased's estate reflect
the importance of family relationships. The heirs are seized by the law
alone, since they are seen to carry on the deceased's personality,
including personal responsibility for his or her debts unless they have
accepted the succession with benefit of inventory. The role of
testamentary executors is much weaker than in the common law, where
they are said to have a kind of defeasible ownership in the property of
the deceased's estate. 63
A final concept which rounds out this tour of French and Italian
family law is the "interest of the family," a term which has entered the
civil codes in the last fifty years. A number of the provisions dealing with
the rights and duties of marriage and parenthood refer to the "interest
of the family" as a factor which must be taken into account before a
particular act can occur, or a certain decision can be made. In France,
since 1965 it has been possible for a married couple to change their
matrimonial regime if this is "in the interest of the family." 64 The notion
that the spouses together determine "the orientation of family life" in
Italian law gets at the same idea as does the obligation of the spouses to
"collaborate in the interest of the family" when making decisions
concerning its welfare. 65 It is worth noting that this corporate
conception of the nuclear family's interests has remained constant
notwithstanding the shift from paternal and marital authority to spousal
and parental equality. Where doctrine and jurisprudence formerly
constrained, at least to some extent, the patriarch's potentially despotic
power under the nineteenth-century codes, subsequent legislation has
extended these constraints to the newly equalized spouses.

62 J. Goody, "Introduction" in J. Goody, . Thirsk & E.P. Thompson, eds., Family and
Inheritance: Rural Society in Western Europe, 1200-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1976) at 1. And for a particularly sensitive discussion of the conflicting imperatives around
inheritance faced by Italian parents who own family businesses, see S. . Yanagisako, "Capital and
Gendered Interest in Italian Family Firms" in D. L Kurtzer & R. P. Sailer, eds., The Familyin Italy
from Antqui to the Present (Yale University Press, 1991).
63
Comnisionerof Stamp Duties (Queensland)v. Livingston, [1965] A.C. 694 (P.C.).
64

ArL 1397 C. civ. This article has prompted a fair amount of doctrinal controversy. After
some initial cynicism about its utility, doctrine and jurisprudence have now admitted that a couple's
request for a change in regime can be denied if it will adversely affect inheritance rights of the
children, for example. See Cass. civ. Ire, 8 June 1982, D. 1983, Jur. 19 (Annot. M. Beaubrun).
65
Arts. 144-145 C. civ.
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I turn now to the common law. Unlike jurisdictions with civil
codes, there is no legislatively sanctified account of the parameters or
essentials of family law in common law jurisdictions. In recent years,
Family Law Acts have begun to proliferate, but they seldom purport to
be complete statements of the law, and on closer examination may in
fact deal only with matrimonial property. In particular, the private and
public law relating to children tends to be found in distinct Children's
Law Acts and not in Family Law Acts at all. Even within a subset of
family law such as that governing parent and child, one must consult a
whole variety of sources. As Brenda Hoggett has said in her book on
this subject, "the law does not provide us with a neat little list of
[parental rights, powers and duties]. There is only a patchwork of
legislation and decided cases on particular points." 66 So enured has the
common lawyer become to this state of affairs that one may detect a
certain cynicism about whether the "neat little list" would work. Legal
academic writing has seen its role as primarily glossatorial, and has
provided little theoretical underpinning to assist in the synthesis of the
disparate sources of family law. Peter Mann Bromley's first edition
devoted one page to "The Scope of Family Law,' 67 and subsequent
English texts provide a maximum of two pages of introduction or skip
the preliminaries altogether. The United States author James Schouler
lamented this tendency in the first edition of his work, but his complaint
went unheard and he relegated much of his own preliminary and
reflective material to footnotes in subsequent editions of his book, which
came more and more to resemble the standard hornbook treatise. 68
We have already seen that the common law tends to define
family as a question of fact rather than law. But the basic legal
relationships of marriage and parenthood or kinship have also been,
historically at least, very muddled. With regard to marriage, it took the
English four centuries to do what the Council of Trent did in 1563 for
Catholic Europe: establish a clear set of formalities for a legally valid

66

Parentsand Children:the Law of ParentalResponsibility, 3d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell,
1987) at v.
67
FamilyLaw (London: Butterworth & Co., 1957) at 1-2. See, more recently, the fifth edition
of this book published in 1976.
68
Supra note 14, 6th ed. Schouler was an historian as well as a lawyer, and this may explain
his initial willingness to explore larger questions of family law which "ordinary" lawyers tended to
avoid.
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marriage. 69 According to Lawrence Stone, "the marriage law as it
operated in practice in England from the fourteenth to the nineteenth
centuries was a mess. ... leaving in a fog of uncertainty rights to property,
dower, jointure, inheritance, and the legitimacy of children."7 0 Even
today, the view is tenaciously held by many cohabiting couples that their
consent and community recognition are sufficient to constitute
"common law marriage." 7 '
With regard to parenthood, the situation has become less, rather

than more, clear over time. Many common law jurisdictions now
recognize statutory support and other obligations towards children to
whom one stands in loco parentis as well as towards one's biological
children. 72 To the legal tie of biological and adoptive kinship can be
added legal obligations arising out of purely factual situations of
somewhat uncertain parameters. It would thus appear that there are
really two species of childhood in the common law, although no one has
really explored this in any detail.
Australian writers also agree that the family has no general legal
definition. Anthony Dickey states that
neither the common law nor equity has ever concerned itself specifically with families.
Instead, each has concerned itself only with the relationships and the essential status,
rights, duties, powers and liabilities that exist between particular members of families.73

He goes on to note that not even the federal Family Law Act
197574 is concerned with families generally. Frank Bates's Introduction

69

In France, the prevailing gallican doctrine demanded that these canon law requirements be
promulgated by royal edict as state requirements for the validity of marriage, but in fact the two
were virtually identical. In fact, the state requirements were slightly stricter than the canon law
requirements, leading to a few situations where a marriage validly recognized under canon law
would not be held to produce civil effects: . Imbert, "Les t6moins an mariage du Concile de Trente
A1792, en France" in P. Ganghofer, ed, Le drmit de la famille en Europe: son dvoiutionde l'anquiti
a nosjours (Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 1992) at 307.
70 L Stone, Road to Divome: England 1530-1987, 3d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992) at 135-36.
7
1This is actually a survival of the medieval canon law theory of marriage, which was stamped
out on the continent by the Council of Trent, but persisted in England with sufficient strength to be
carried throughout the empire in succeeding centuries.

72 See, for example, FamilyLawAct, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 1(1) (definition of "child") and ss.
31-32.
73

FamilyLaw (Sydney: Law Book, 1985) at 3.

74

Australia (Coin).

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[yoi- 32 NO. 3

to Family Law75 has its first chapter entitled "Australian Family Law:
The Background," but it turns out that this background is mainly to do
with constitutional law. The eclectic nature of family law is well
illustrated by Bates's decision to make the first substantive chapter of his
book one on families outside of marriage.
An Australian text provides us with a clue as to why writers in
the common law tradition are reticent to elaborate on the theoretical
basis or fundamental policy choices embedded in family law. Frank
Bates observes that "the legal issues which are involved are concerned
with matters deeply based in the human condition, however pompous
that may sound." 76 The writer is clearly embarrassed to discuss matters
which are so "deeply personal." 77 A profound cultural block prevents
him from discussing openly the values which underlie family law. It is
simply not done. The contrast with French and Italian writers, who
regularly begin their texts with a ritual invocation of the life course and
panegyrics to family life, is quite striking. 78 One must admit that there is
at times a heavy dose of ideology in the French and Italian descriptions
of family life, and a desire to believe that life really is lived in the
categories defined by the civil code. Nonetheless, even a study of the
comparative rhetoric of these texts is quite revealing about underlying
ideas.
On a different note, the relatively eclectic nature of family law in
the common law world has meant that treatise-writers have been able to
incorporate chapters on domestic violence in recent editions;79 in this
way they have recognized the growing legislative concern with the topic,
80
which has begun to appear even in some "core" family law statutes.
One might also hypothesize that the recognition of homosexual couples
for at least some purposes of family law will be accomplished more easily

75
(Sydney. Nsw Law Book, 1987) at 2. To be fair, Bates also makes some useful points about
the recent origins of family law as an academic subject and its traditional devaluation by the legal
professions. See also O'Donovan, supra,note 16 at c. 2.
76
/bTa at 2.
77

bkl

78

See, for example, Carbonnier, supra note 50 at 26; P. Malaurie & L Ayn s, Cours de dmoil
CviL La Famile, 2d ed. (Paris: Cujas, 1989) at 13.
79

See, for example, S. M. Cretney & I M. Masson, Princ/esof FamilyLaw (London: Sweet
& Maxwell, 1990) c. 9.
80 FamilyLawAct, supra note 72,s. 29(3)().
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in the common law world precisely because of the tendency to adopt
functional, rather than legal, definitions of the family.81
C. Polyphony
I have been proceeding as if formal state law were the only
source of "family law" relevant to the present inquiry-an assumption
which is clearly incorrect. Before the French Revolution, both in
England and on the continent, there were at least two other normative
orders which not only influenced but constituted important areas of
family law. Religious and aristocratic conceptions of the family were
articulated in distinct bodies of law applied in autonomous courts. In
France, England, and Italy, ecclesiastical courts decided the validity of
marriages, which in turn had important effects on dower rights,
inheritance in general, and the legitimacy of children. In England, the
High Court of Chivalry had exclusive jurisdiction to deal with various
matters relating to the right to bear arms (for example, coats of arms),
which implicated it in matters of succession and genealogy.82 It applied
a body of heraldic law which was civilian in procedure, but primarily
English custom (distinct from the common law) in substance. Similar
institutions existed on the continent.83
Religious norms, whether encountered directly in the
ecclesiastical courts or indirectly in the common law of the land, strongly
influenced conceptions of marital and familial obligations. Thus, the
French historian Flandrin uses the canon law notion of "prohibited
degrees" of consanguineous marriage to understand how far people of
the early modem period might have understood their kinship group to
extend.84 Religious teaching reinforced the importance of the
81

The law is in a state of flux at the moment, with the English Court of Appeal ruling that a
woman did not qualify as a "family member" of her deceased lesbian partner for the purpose of
succeeding to the latter's protected tenancy under the Rent Acts: HarrogateBorough Council v.
Simpson, [1986] 2 F.S.R. 91 (complaint rejected as inadmissible by the European Commission, S. v.
U4 47 D.R. 274 (1986)). The New York Court of Appeals has reached the opposite conclusion:
Brasci v. StahlAssociates Co. 544 N.Y.S. 2d 784 (1989). On the European situation, see YL Waaldijk
& A. Clapham, eds., Homosexuality: A European Community Issue. Essays on Lesbian and Gay
Rights in EuropeanLaw andPolicy (Dordrecht, Neth.: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993).
82 G.D. Squibb, The High Court of Chivalry: A study of the Civil Law in England (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1959).
83
R. Chabanne, Le rigimejuridque des armobies (1954).
84
3.-L Flandrin, Familles:parent4 maison, serua/it dans l'ancienne socitt6 (Paris: Hachette,
1976) at 24-25,29-32.
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alimentary obligation between spouses and near relatives, which an
encyclical of Leo XIII did not hesitate to qualify as a "sacred duty." 85
This duty extended not just to maintaining children during their youth,
but obliged the father to "provide them with a patrimony to help them in
86
defending themselves against the surprise attacks of ill fortune."
Catholic teaching thus supported the idea of forced heirship out of a
concern for family unity, stability, and continuity. These concerns, of
course, also underlay the long resistance to the introduction of divorce in
Italy. Its reintroduction in France in 1884 was due to the actions of the
avowedly anti-clerical government of the Third Republic.
Religious teaching did not simply support or justify particular
doctrines of family law; it provided a moral basis for family law as a
whole. This did not really change even after the French Revolution
claimed the whole of family law as a field of exclusively secular
regulation and abolished all traces of official ecclesiastical power.
Secular form and largely clerical content characterized family law in
both France and Italy after their respective codifications. The
continuing relevance of religious norms can be seen in a certain
literature which uses Catholic ethical precepts to critique the whole of
family law, a scholarly genre which has no real counterpart in the
common law world.87 This literature does not always adopt the positions
which a late twentieth-century observer might predict. The French
theologian Pierre M61ine, for example, disapproved in the 1920s of the
extensive incapacities of women married in community of property,
lamented the widow's subordination to the children in succession law,
and thought that a father's legal powers over his children were too
extensive. To an ideology of individualism he opposed the notion that
the rights of both spouses should be seen as subordinate to the objects of
domestic society, although he tempered this view with the injunction that
"marriage does not abolish the principle, 'To every one his own.' "88
These views ultimately lived on in the codal adoption of "the interest of
the family" as a means of arbitrating family disputes.8 9

85 Quoted in P. M6line, The Moral Law of the Family, trans. Patrick Browne (London: Sands
& Co., 1929) at 125.
861Ibid.
87 A concern with maintaining the indissolubilist view of marriage inspired a number of
Anglican tracts on this particular subject, but studies of the whole of family law from a Protestant
perspective are rare, perhaps non-existent.
88 M6line, supra note 85 at 136.
89
See text accompanying notes 64 and 65.
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The Reformation began to alter the content of norms of familial
behaviour, both reflecting and in turn reshaping new conceptions of the
family. In its initial phases, the Reformation insisted on the centrality of
the nuclear family over the wider web of kinship connections and
emphasised individual standards of ethical behaviour over the ties of
blood.90 While the Church until 1917 prohibited marriages between
blood relatives up to the fourth degree of kinship (third cousins) and
between affines to the third degree, the Reformation dramatically
reduced the scope of these prohibitions to include only siblings, direct
ascendants and descendants, and their spouses.9 1 This privileging of
sentiment over blood and duty can be seen most clearly in the
widespread adoption of divorce in Protestant jurisdictions in both the
Old and New Worlds and even in England where the Anglican Church
92
opposed the move.
The circumscription of the family during the Reformation did
not end with its living kin: the dead too were also abandoned. The
Reformation resolutely opposed the practice of anniversary Masses
dedicated to the memory of deceased family members, and, crudely put,
advised people to forget their dead and concentrate on the future. This
reshaping of the relationship between living and dead family members
had an impact not only on mourning practices but on succession law.
The notion of the heirs carrying on the personality of the deceased came
increasingly into disrepute, as they came to be seen merely as trustees of
the deceased's assets pending distribution.
A second set of norms which both constituted and infused
"family law" was the aristocratic code. In pre-revolutionary France and
Italy and in England, aristocratic conceptions of the family directed
marriage and inheritance strategies toward "accumulating and
maintaining a family material and symbolic capital in the person of a
single child"-normally the eldest sonY3 In England, primogeniture was
90 S. Ozment, Protestants:The Birth of a Revolution (New York. Double Day, 1993) c. 7. There
is considerable historical controversy over the precise role of the Reformation with regard to shifts

in attitudes towards women and children. In what follows I try to confine myself to some fairly
general and uncontroversial observations.
91 J. Jackson, The Law relatingto the Formationand Annulment of ManiageandAlliedMatters,

2d ed. (London: Butterworths, 1951) at 22-23.
92 R. Phillips, Putting Asunder A History of Divorce in the Western World (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988).
93 M. Segalen, " 'Avoir sa part': sibling relations in partible inheritance Brittany," in H.
Medick & D. W. Sabean, eds., Interest and emotion: Essays in the Study of Family and inship
(Cambridge University Press, 1984) 129 at 138. Classes beyond the nobility in southern France and
parts of Italy also practiced primogeniture under the ancien rigime, either as a mandatory mode of
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the normal mode of inheritance for all freehold land until 1926, but the
aristocracy usually buttressed it with inter vivos settlements which
entailed land exclusively on male issue in order to avoid the
fragmentation of land through the coparcenary interests of females. 94
On the continent, inheritance laws were more variable but always
provided sufficient flexibility to allow the nobility to settle their estates in
tail male if they wished. The eldest son often inherited a set of
obligations towards younger siblings, but it was never expected that the
latter would attain a standard of equality, in material wealth or prestige,
with their privileged brother.95
The aristocratic ethos was thus totally at odds with egalitarian
notions about the family and the revolutionaries of 1789 sought to stamp
it out in the new code. Bourgeois notions of sibling equality were
mandated for everyone, high and low, North and South, with the only
concession to parental caprice being the relatively small "free share,"
which might be used to advantage particular children above their forced
share. Indeed, the one (unsuccessful) attempt to alter this distributional
scheme in nineteenth-century France was aimed at prohibiting a gift of
the free share to anyone who benefitted from mandatory inheritance
rightsY6 Equal inheritance rights for siblings have long had a highly
political resonance in France and Italy. When reinforced by traditional
Catholic teaching it is no surprise that these ideas have become deeply
entrenched in the general culture.
Within the common law world one must of course distinguish
between England, where aristocratic norms, especially in the form of
primogeniture, long retained some influence, and the United States,
Canada, and Australia, where they were largely irrelevant. In England,
aristocrats with substantial landed estates still tend to entail them on the
eldest son, since this device was carefully preserved for them even as

inheritance or pursuant to testamentary freedom.
94

E. Spring, Law, Lan4 and Family:AristocraticInheritancein Englana 1300 to 1800 (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993). For a good study of the rigor with which these
practices were maintained, see L Stone, "Inheritance strategies among the English landed elite
1540-1880" in La mod~e familialEuroplen: Normes, diviances, contr~le du pouvoir,Actes des
s~minaires organis&spar l'Pcole frangaise de Rome et l'Universitadi Roma (1984) (Rome: tcolo
frangaise de Rome, 1986) 267; (90-95 per cent of all transfers of gentry's country houses in two
English counties passed within the family over 340 years).
95

Younger sons in Languedoc were left in a particularly vulnerable position, which commonly
led to an explosion of family tensions in the eighteenth century: Y. Castan, "Arbitraire du droit de
tester et rdvolte des fils en Languedoc au XVIIIe si~cle" in Le modefamilial,ibi at 165.
96 B. Schnapper, "La droite, la gauche et le Code civil: la r~forme du droit familial sous la
lIame R6publique" in Ganghofer, ed., supra note 69,193.
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primogeniture was finally abolished in the Law of PropertyAct 1925Y7
One would not be surprised if the practices of the rest of English society,
and of Canada and Australia, began to conform with those observed in
the United States. Historians of inheritance have found no
discrimination between the shares provided to sons and daughters in
United States wills by the end of the nineteenth century.98 Nonetheless,
the fact that such testamentary treatment remains within the realm of
discretion, rather than right, gives a different cast to this aspect of family
relations than one finds in France or Italy. So strongly is it felt that
testamentary disposition should remain within the discretion of the
testator, that the forced heirship provisions of the Civil Code of
Louisiana 9 (unique in North America in this respect) are sometimes
cited as preventing people from moving into the state.
This brief review of the historical impact of different normative
orders on legal ideas about the family leaves us with an irony. In
jurisdictions with state churches (Anglican England and Puritan New
England) there is today little discernible residue of religious norms in
family law. In France and Italy, where the revolution abolished the state
church, Catholic norms have continued to influence the contours of
family law, and to help justify public provision for families at an early
date, as we shall see in the next section. A strong reaction to the
inegalitarian aristocratic family led to the adoption of bourgeois family
norms in the new civil codes, based on the importance of kinship ties
over lineage, mutual support of all family members, and the equality of
all siblings.
These religious and social ideologies provided a strong
counterpoint to the "possessive individualism" which increasingly
characterized other areas of French and Italian law and the common law
in the nineteenth century. Protestantism, whether of the Anglican or
Dissenting variety, tended to provide little opposition to the increasing
tendency to dissolve the family into individual rights-bearing subjects.
Indeed, the general Protestant orientation toward individual salvation
may have assisted this process. Certainly the most "Protestant" society

97 F.M.L Thompson, "Land and Politics in England in the Nineteenth Century" in
Transactionsofthe RoyalbZtorical Society, series 5, voL 15 (London: Offices of the Royal Historical
Society, 1965) at 23.
98
C. Shammas et aL, supra note 45 at 108-12. L. Davidoff & C. Hall, in Famiy Fonuwes: Men
and women ofthe English middle class, 1780-1850 (University of Chicago Press, 1987) at 205-07, find
a preference for partible inheritance among the middle classes in their study of early nineteenth
century wills, but it is clear from their evidence that daughters are given less than sons.
99 Arts. 1493-1518.
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of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the United States of America,
was the place where there first emerged the "legal concept of the family
as a collection of separate legal individuals rather than an organic part of
the body politic." 100
II. THE FAMILY IN PUBLIC LAW: IMAGES AND REALITIES
What images of the family does one discern from the public law
of these states? First of all, the constitutions of the English-speaking
countries make no mention of the family, 101 in sharp contrast to the
French and Italian constitutions, which direct the state to safeguard the
interests of families as well as individuals. Nor are the sometimes
substantial social benefits afforded in the English-speaking countries
articulated around any central notion of, or goal for, the family. The
allocation of these benefits may of course have effects, positive or
negative, on the "family;" or, more likely, on particular groups of
families. But these social programmes have developed in a more or less
ad hoc manner as a response to particular crises or perceived problems.
By and large, it can be said that the main spurs to these programmes
have been problems of poverty or sex inequality rather than problems
relating to family or population. If, in the common law world, family law
has been hidden in the interstices of property law as it relates to the
affluent, family law has been found mainly in poverty law (the
Elizabethan poor law and its successors) as it relates to the poor.
Some may be dubious about the idea of any continuity between
the "private" law of family relations and the "public" law of the family as
contained in social security law.102 One example will have to suffice.
Susan Pedersen notes that England and France took different
approaches to the "family circle" when providing allowances to the

10 0

M. Grossberg, Governingthe Hearth:Law and the Family in Nineteenth-CenturyAmerica
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985) at 304.
101 with the exception of the Republic of Ireland. arts. 41 and 42 of the constitution direct the
state to protect the family and guard with particular care the institution of marriage. See, generally,
A.J. Shatter, FamilyLaw in the Republic ofIreland, 3d ed. (Dublin: Wolfhound, 1986) c. 1.
102 1 am not suggesting that there is always a perfect fit between the "private" and "public"
law of the family. It is clear that at present in some common law jurisdictions there is a lack of fit
between the fundamental ideas underlying these two "halves" of family law, as Mary Jane Mossman
and Morag MacLean have shown: "Family Law and Social Welfare: Toward a New Equality" (1986)
5 Can. L Far. L 79. Yet this is arguably because "private" family law has been reformed and social
welfare law has not caught up. Formerly, the two shared a common set of ideas about the male
breadwinner/female dependent model of family life.
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families of soldiers away at the front during the First World War. In
England all soldiers' wives, but no other dependents, were provided with
a living allowance, regardless of need. This was consistent with the
private law, since even affluent wives were under no legal obligation to
contribute to their own support during marriage. 1 03 In France,
applicants had to demonstrate need, but parents and children of the
soldier as well as wives were allowed to apply, on the basis that the Civil
Code imposed an obligation of support in these cases. As well, under
French law the wife had an obligation to contribute to the "household
charges" to the extent that she was able, and so had no right to be
maintained irrespective of her own resources.
A comparative history of the welfare state is beyond the scope of
this paper,10 4 but I do want to look at the specific examples of maternity
benefits and family allowances as suggestive of significant differences in
the conceptualization of the family. It was, of course, the tremendous
anxiety about the declining population, especially in France, that
motivated early state action in that country. In 1913, French law gave an
allowance to all family heads with over three children who could not
support them. This was followed by widespread payment of child
allowances in the civil service and by private industry, until in 1932 all
employers were required to pay them, and in 1938 an allowance was paid
to women who stayed at home with their children. 105 It is true that there
were many illiberal and sometimes racist features to these child
allowances in their early development, which was even more true of the
1 6
child allowances introduced under Italian fascism in the 1920s. 0

103 See Pedersen, supra note 7 at 116; and Collet v. Nash (1923), 39 Times Law Reports 292.
104 There has been a virtual explosion of comparative historical studies of the development of
the welfare state in recent years: in no particular order, see G. Bock & P. Thane, eds., Mateit and
GenderPolicies:Women and the Rise of the European Welfare States 1880s-1950 (London: Routledge,
1991); J. Lewis, ed., Women and Social Policiesin Europe: WorI, Family and the State (Aldershot,
England: Edward Elgar, 1993); S.Pedersen, supra note 7; S.Koven & S. Michel, eds., Mothers of a
New WorUd" MaternalistPolitics andthe Originsof Welfare States (New York: Routledge, 1993); ML
Stewart, Women, Work and the French State. Labour Protectionand Social Patriarc, 1879-1919
(Kingston: McGil-Queen's University Press, 1989). The following also contain relevant historical
material, although not purporting to be "comparative histories of the welfare state": AIL Cook, V.
Lorwin & A.K. Daniels, eds., Women and Trade Unions in Eleven Industrialized Countries
(Philadelphia. Temple University Press, 1984); J. Farley, ed., Women Workers in Fifteen Counhie:
Essays in HonorofAlice Hanson Cook (Ithaca: iLR Press, 1985); MJ. Davidson & C.L. Cooper, eds.,
Working WomenAn InternationalSurvey (Chichester. Wiley, 1984).
105 S.Pedersen, "Catholicism, Feminism, and the Politics of the Family during the Late Third
Republic" in Koven & Michel, eds, biS.
106 See C. Saraceno, "Redefining maternity and paternity: gender, pronatalism and social
policies in fascist Italy" in Bock & Thane, eds., supra note 104,196.
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Nonetheless, as these features were suppressed over time, the basic
philosophy behind these allowances became clearer: the raising of the
next generation was a social labour which required social support. In
spite of, at times, sharp differences over the role of working mothers,
this basic idea was one which socialist trade unions, conservative Roman
Catholics, feminists, and politicians across the spectrum could support.
In England and most Canadian provinces, the 1920s saw the
development of mothers' allowances, but in spirit and practice they were
entirely different from the child allowances of France and Italy.10 7 They
were meant to replace an absent male wage-earner, and were thus paid
only to widows or in some cases to married women whose husbands had
deserted them. The amounts were miniscule and the opportunities for
social surveillance at least as great as existed in France and Italy. In
England, a fairly active campaign for motherhood endowment in the
1920s was consistently resisted by the men of the Labour party, who
feared that child allowances would undermine their claims for a family
wage. There was certainly some justification for this fear both in
England and on the continent, yet the French and Italian labour
movements in the end supported the child allowances, arguably because
of a different conceptualization of the family. The pervasive
Malthusianism of English social thought meant that the idea of social
support for all children was viewed with some unease. One of the
supporters of the motherhood endowment campaign of the 1920s, the
Eugenics Society, thought that any allowance should be restricted to
those mothers having an income of over 500 £ per annum, so that a "true
aristocracy" could be created. 108
Universal family allowances finally came into existence in
England at the end of the Second World War only because employers
warned they could not keep up with wage demands in the wake of
wartime inflation. Even then, at a time when the cost of maintaining a
child was determined to be 7s./week, the benefit was set "deliberately
and substantially lower," at 5s./week, in order to maintain work
107

D. Guest, The Emergence of Socida Security in Canada, 2d ed. (Vancouver University of
British Columbia Press) at 48-63. Pedersen, supra note 7 at 17 sums up the difference between the
British and French models as follows:
[Tihe evolution of British social policy [articulates] ... a male breadwinner logic of
welfare, [while] French policies came to rest on a very different logic, [the] ... 'parental.'
Parental policies do not assume that women are necessarily dependent, nor that men
always have 'families to keep'; rather, they presume the dependence of children alone
and hence redistribute income primarily across family types and not along gender lines.
108 J. Lewis, "Models of equality for women: the case of state support for children in
twentieth-century Britain" in Back & Thane, eds., supra note 104, 73.
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incentives. In the end, the benefit was insufficient to substantially
alleviate child poverty, to provide incentives to parenthood, or to
provide any independence for women and children, and has been
allowed to erode substantially in value until the present day, with the
exception of a half-dozen years in the 1960s.109
The United States has never had a universal family allowance.
The main income support is the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children, which is aimed at poor families with children. It began in 1935
as a poverty programme rather than a family programme, and its main
goal, aside from the amelioration of poverty, is limiting family size
among the poor. In many states no benefit is available after the third
child, a prohibition which has proved invulnerable to constitutional
challenge. It is hard to believe that the deliberate avoidance of universal
family benefits in the United States is not at some level motivated by
racist fears of an explosion in the Black population.' 0 In this case,
general ideas about the privacy of the family and particular concerns
about race coalesce to keep family policy issues off the United States
agenda.
The position with regard to maternity benefits has followed
similar lines in both sets of countries. The movement for female
emancipation, which grew up in Italy after 1890, expressly adopted the
was a 'real social labour.' "111
idea that "the work of motherhood ...

Female employment was high in Italy and France and working women
had developed mutual aid societies to assist in each other's confinements
by the last third of the nineteenth century. The Italian state took up this
idea in 1910 by creating the Cassa Nazionale di Maternita, a fund
supported by female employees, employers, and the state, which
provided a daily allowance of 4/5 of the average wage to (mainly
industrial) working women for the first month after confinement. 12
This was extended to 10 weeks in 1934, 3 1/2 months in 1950, and
ultimately to 5 months in 1971, with remuneration set at 80 per cent of
one's normal pay in 1950. In 1971 it became possible to add another 6
109

Ibid. at 86-88.

110 Mary Ann Glendon alludes to this, noting that many states with large welfare populations
have continued to provide public funding for abortions even though not constitutionally obliged to
do so, but no state has significantly raised its level of support to families with dependent children:
Abortion andDivorcein Western Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987) at 56.
111 A. Buttafuoco, "Motherhood as a political strategy: the role of the Italian women's
movement in the creation of the Cassa Nazionale di Matemita" in Bock & Thane, eds., supra note
104, 178 at 181.
112 Ibid
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months at 30 per cent of one's pay, and women were given the right to
unpaid leave to care for sick children until their third year. Two periods
of daily rest are also provided for until the child is a year old.113 In
France maternity benefits began in 1913 and followed a very similar
course. At present, leave is set at 16 weeks at 90 per cent of salary, with
the possibility of a further two years of unpaid leave for either parent.
As in Italy, the social security system finances the benefit.1 1 4
By way of contrast, paid maternity leave did not begin in Canada
until 1971, where its placement in the Unemployment InsuranceAct 1 5
made it clear that the measure was conceived of as employment policy,
rather than family policy. In Britain, paid maternity leave did not begin
until 1977. It was already being cut back in the 1980s when it came to be
described in a government Green Paper as "a form of reward for
continuous service with one employer for a period of years,"11 6 as
opposed to an entitlement. Clearly, it is not seen as part of family policy
in Britain either. Australia guaranteed a maternity benefit (not
maternity leave), regardless of marital status or paid labour force
participation, as early as 1912, but this benefit related to population
policy rather than family policy. It was a racist, pronatalist measure
designed to fill up the continent with whites: aboriginal, Pacific Islander,
and Asian women were excluded.1 1 7 The benefit was abolished in 1978,
and it was only in 1990 that the Industrial Relations Commission, which
administers Australia's centralized wage-fixing system, adopted a
principle of unpaid parental leave which allows men and women to share
twelve months leave.1 1 8
In the United States, a few states provide for unpaid maternity
leave for most working women, but at the national level coverage is only

113 M.V. Ballestrero, "Women at Work in Italy:. Legislation-Evolution and Prospects" in
Davidson & Cooper, eds, supra note 104,103.
114
A. Michel, "France" in A. Cook, V.R. Lorwin & A.K. Daniels, eds., supra note 104,112.
115R.S.C. 1985, c. U-1.
116 Quoted in J. Conaghan & L Chudleigh, "Women in Confinement: Can Labour Law
Deliver the Goods?" (1987) 14 J. of Law & Soc. 133 at 133.
11
7 M. Lake, "A Revolution in the Family: The Challenge and the Contradictions of Maternal
Citizenship in Australia" in Koven & Michel, eds., supra note 104,378. As Lake suggests, the lack
of concern with family policy is shown by continued governmental resistance to any notion of child
endowment until after the Second World War. For the later history of maternity allowances, see
T.H. Kewley, Australian Social Security Today: Major developments from 1900 to 1978 (Sydney:
Sydney University Press, 1980) at 88-90.
11
8 R. Graycar & J. Morgan, The Hidden Gender of Law (Annandale, NSW: Federation Press,
1990) at 85, note 37.
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available under the 1978 Pregnancy Disability Amendment to the Civil
RightsAct,119 which forces those employers who have disability insurance
programmes to treat pregnancy as an illness under those programmes. 120
It is clear that the amendment was "related historically to civil rights
[concerns], the women's movement, and the growth of United States
social policy generally," rather than to any concern about family policy
as such. 21 It is sobering to realize that the following words of Julia
Lathrop, head of the United States Children's Bureau, remain nearly as
apt today as when she wrote them 75 years ago, in 1919. She had just
compiled a study of international maternity benefits, which she
transmitted to her superior "in the hope that the information might
prove useful to the people of one of the few great countries which as yet
have no system of state or national assistance in maternity-the United
States."122
III. CONCLUSION
What can one conclude after this comparative overview? What
are the "lessons" which I have promised in my title? Let me first observe
that a certain interest in family policy seems to be reviving, if the amount
of journalistic attention devoted to such issues is any indication. Even in
this cynical age, there is still a temptation to believe that we might be
able to do something worthwhile in this area by passing statutes and
eking some scarce dollars out of the public till.
My point is that we must first decide what importance we attach
to children and to family life, understood in its broadest sense. If we
accept that law is a reflection of cultural values, albeit an imperfect one,
then an historical overview of the family law and family policy of the
English-speaking countries suggests that there is a tendency to value
liberty and property at the expense of solidaristic and child-centred
119 Civil Rights Act of 1964-PregnancyDiscrimination,Pub. L No. 95-555, Stat. 2076 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1989)).
120
S.B. Kamerman, A-.. Kahn & P. Kingston, Maternity Policiesand Working Women (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1983). The respected United States economist V.R. Fuchs has
concluded in Women's Quest for Economic Equality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1988) at 130-138, that the adoption of family support measures, including a universal child
allowance, would do far more to remedy child poverty and women's access to labour than all labour
market initiatives which have taken place to date.
121 Ibid.at 6.
122 As quoted in "Introduction: Mother Worlds" in Koven & Michel, eds.,supra note 104,1 at
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values. This seems amply proven by the relative rates of poverty in
households with children, especially in single-parent households. In
Italy, where 22 per cent of households fall below the poverty line, 27 per
cent of single-parent households fall in this category. There is a
discrepancy, but it is not terribly large. In France, the relative figures are
of a similar order, 15 per cent and 22 per cent; but in the United
Kingdom the disparity rises to 17 per cent and 30 per cent; in the United
States, 10 per cent and 50 per cent; and in Canada, 11 per cent and 62
per centj23
I realize that the phrase "solidaristic and child-centred" is
susceptible of many interpretations: Mussolini would have said that his
government's policies were solidaristic and child-centred, but that is not
what I mean, and the difficulty of articulating what I do mean indicates
precisely the dilemma. Perhaps my meaning is best illustrated by
recapitulating French family policy: the French have aimed, for
historically pronatalist reasons, to support as much as possible, both
economically and socially, the decision to bear and raise children. They
have regarded the maintenance and socialization of the next generation
as a kind of partnership between the family and the state, with social
solidarity seen as an extension of familial solidarity. Over time, the
coercive aspects of family policy attributable to pronatalist philosophy
have disappeared, such that both the desires of women who wish to
return to work relatively soon after birth and the desires of those who
wish to stay home for an elongated period are equally supported by the
state. The right of the child to a welcoming environment does not trump
the mother's right to work, nor is the mother's right to work purchased
at the cost of inadequate child care arrangements. That is a policy
which I would describe as both solidaristic and child-centred.
Yet, if this kind of approach sounds even slightly attainable in
Canada, we must still recall that in France it was the product of a
particular set of cultural values and cultural conflicts, particularly those
between conservative Catholics and socialists. In this regard, the
experience of Italy is instructive, but in a somewhat negative way. Italy is
123
The European figures come from M. Cross, "Generating the 'new poverty': a European
comparison" in R. Simpson & R. Walker, eds., Europe"forricherorpoorer? (London: CpAO, 1993) at
17. The United States figures (which may be an underestimate) are from E.A. Anderson, "The
Future of Family Policy. A Postscript," in E.A. Anderson & R.C. Hula, eds., The Reconstruction of
Family Policy (New York. Greenwood, 1991) 239. The Canadian figures are from S. Torman,
"Crests and Crashes: The Changing Tides of Family Income Security" in Baker, ed., supra note 3 at
76. The United States and Canadian figures cannot be precisely compared with each other or with
the European figures since they use national definitions of poverty, but they provide a rough guide
for comparison.
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a country where, if anything, there is even more of a cultural
commitment to the institution of the family than in France, and Italy had
a reasonably effective family policy in the decades after the Second
World War. Yet, in recent decades Italy's family policy has begun to
unravel, for reasons which are too complex to detail here. Responsibility
for family policy was devolved to the regions in 1970, so that there is
little national presence in the area. Family allowances were abolished in
1983, and emphasis has rapidly shifted from supporting families to
supporting only the poorest famililes. In the last decade the birthrate in
Italy has fallen to the lowest of any country in the world; the average
woman can expect to give birth to 1.3 children, far below the
replacement level. It is not clear whether this phenomenon can be
linked directly to the changes in family policy, but it does seem clear at
least that there is not a very good fit between the value which Italian
culture in general places on children, and state policies in the area.124
In thinking about the importance we place on the family in
Canada, we must consider the strong attachment to the family which
exists among the First Nations and virtually all the places which have
contributed to our immigration inflow over the past 40 or 50 years,
beginning with the Mediterranean countries, and more recently, Africa,
Asia, the Caribbean, and South America. Concepts of family among the
populations of these countries are probably more like those found
historically in France and Italy, than those found in the English-speaking
countries. Whether that fact will translate into support for more
extensive family support policies is a moot point, but it is nonetheless a
question worth asking. As the example of Italy shows, a strong cultural
commitment to the family does not necessarily translate into a vigorous
family policy; the former is perhaps a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for the latter. My concluding point, though, is that AngloUnited States attitudes towards the family, as manifested in both our
culture and our law, have very deep roots in English Canada, and only by
examining these rigorously can we expect to think clearly about these
issues.

124 For an historical review and critique of Italian family policy, see P. Donat, "Family and
Population Policy in Italy" in Dumon, ed., supra note 2, 207; and his La famiglia come relazione
sociak (Milan: Angeli, 1989).

